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Also - auf besonderen Wunsch hier ein Auszug aus HOME WATERS, dem geheimen Admiralstabswerk der RN. Im Gegensatz zur deutschen Version werden hier auch unliebsame Wahrheiten gesagt, z. B. das Jellicoe die Admiralität schon früh daran erinnerte, das die Dreadnoughts der RN den Großlinienschiffen der KM in Sachen Panzerung und Unterteilung unterlegen sind. Oder das Beatty haarklein aufzählt, wieviele englische Schiffe in die Luft geflogen sind und er sich fragt ob das wirklich so sein muß, denn bei deutschen Schiffen wäre das nämlich nicht vorgekommen, nicht einmal bei SMS WIESBADEN, die mehr oder weniger von der ganzen Home Fleet bearbeitet worden ist. Na ja, lest selbst:
CONFIDENTIAL
Attention is called to the Penalties attaching to any infraction of the Offical Secrets Act
NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL)
Volume XVII
HOME WATERS, PART VII
CHAPTER I.
POST JUTLAND
1. Technical Committees. – The bulk of the Grand Fleet had returned to port by June2, and at 9.45 p.m. on that day Admiral Jellicoe was able to report the fleet ready for sea at four hours‘ notice. The first announcement written by the First Lord of the Admirality and issued to the Press on June 2 was brief and coldly accurate. It spoke of „heavy losses“ in the Battle Cruiser Fleet and announced them. Its candour gave at first a severe shock to public confidence and aroused in some circles a feeling of surprise and indignation. The German account, appearing in the continental papers 24 hours before the first official telegram from London, produced an unfortunate impression on the neutral mind. It said nothing of the loss of the LÜTZOW, ROSTOCK and ELBING, or of the terrible damaage to the SEYDLITZ and DERFFLINGER, and the Admiralty communiqué seemed at first to confirm the wild statements of a stupendous Germany victory. But the mist of uncertainty cleared away, and it was quickly apparent that whatever the Germans might say the battle had not altered the general situation at sea. A whole series of enquiries were at once set on foot in the Grand Fleet to consider the various technical aspects of the battle and to remedy any deficiencies which it had revealed. A number of committees were formed for this work, of which the following were the principal:
Committee on Protection –
(Battleships) Rear Admiral A. C. Leveson
(Cruisers) Captain John Dumaresq
Torpedo Committee Rear Admiral E. F. Gaunt
Wireless Committee Captain G. H. Borrett
Anti-Flame and Gas Rear Admiral Hugh Evan Thomas
Gunnery Captain Frederick Dreyer
Signal Captain Fred L. Field
Searchlight Captain Fred L. Field
Engineering Engr. Capt. A. R. Emdin
It is not possible to do more than give a brief summary of these enquiries (They will be found in H.S.A. 229, 230, 231). They are detailed and involved. But, though many of their recommendations have been subsequently embodied in later ships and have passed into the current of everyday thought, they still repay persual, for they were drafted in the light of battle experience still glowing in the fleet and in reading them one can at least appreciate the enormous ramifications of work involved.
The dark cloud that rose from the QUEEN MARY hung like a shadow over the fleet, and the question of cardinal importance was the protection of the vitals of ships from plunging fire. Two committees sat on this subject, one for cruisers and light cruisers (for names of members see H.S.A. 129) under Captain Dumaresq, and on for Battleships under Admiral Leveson. They began immediatly to investigate –
A. The Protection necessary to ensure vitals – magazines, engine-rooms and conning tower against shell penetration.
B. The adequacy of magazine arrangements against flash and flame from bursting shell and internal explosion.
C. The prevention of ignition of a train of cordite charges between guns and magazines.
A committee was formed too, at the Admiralty to analyse gunnery records and all ships were ordered to send to in their Dreyer plotting charts and any other range or bearing records. These were analysed and eight months later the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the records were not sufficient to enable an opinion of any value to be formed as to the accuracy of the fire (C.-in-C. 7.9.12, Adty. 1.2.17 in H.S.A. 229).
Other importent questions figuring prominently in these reports were the instantaneity of the German recognition signals, the use of searchlights at night, the use of smoke, and the use of star shell.
The Gunnery Committee (Battle Fleet [Capt. Frederick Dreyer] and Battle Cruisers [Capt. A. E. Chatfield]) put forward a number of suggestions, chiefly on the subject of more rapid methods of ranging. The Torpedo Committee recommended better methods of controlling searchlights, and suggested a torpedo with a speed of 25 knots at 15,000 yards range. Important recommendations, too, came from the Anti-Flame and Gas Committee (Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan Thomas [President]) for the provision of gloves and helmets and fearnought overalls for fire parties, and stress was also laid on certain simpler requirements, such as a sufficiency of candle lanterns and wooden plugs for damaged fire mains.
A point of which wide unanimity of opinion prevailed was the necessity of improvement in the searchlight defence. It was decided to fit seven projectors in capital ships, but a host of minor difficulties cropped up in the sphere, chiefly in the way of finding suitable positions in the different types of ships (For much information on the Searchlight Committee see H.S.A. 231.). It was nearly a year before prints of the arrangement of platforms for the 36-in. projectors were approved and the work of the Committee extended over many months.
The Signal Committee put forward suggestions for a standard system of internal communication intended to overcome the difficulties arising from the dispersion of signal, wireless, decoding, cipher and intelligence offices in different parts of the ship. They urged the necessity of the coding office being adjacent to the wireless office. and presented a detailed plan for the arrangement of offices, together with a system for the ditsribution of signals based on the collective experience of the Grand Fleet (H.S.A. 230.) during the war.
One department which could be viewed with distinct satisfaction was that of engineering. Generally speaking, the propelling machinery had run very well indeed, though the heavy vibration set up by salvo firing and shell hits emphasised the necessity of greater rigidity in the flanges of joints (Report by Engr. Capt. A.R. Emdin, 5th B.S. in H.S.A. 230. In the case of the WARSPITE, about 6 p.m. the steering engine had „slowed up“ due to the thrust shaft warming, which had led to an urgend order for increased helm and undue force on the wheel, resulting in a jamb.).
These investigations covered many subjects of varying degrees of complexity, and from them sprang the series of improvements and reforms which may be summarised in the single term of „Post Jutland“.
2. Armour Protection. – The question that weighed most heavily in the Fleet was that of armour protection. The Commander-in-Chief laid special stress on this point in his despatch (H.S. 301/40 C.-in-C. to Admiralty. June 18 1916, 1396 H.F. 0022, par. 6, in M.05697. This is the first despatch sent in by C.-in-C.) and expressed a very definite opinion on it. „The facts which contributed to British losses were, first, the indifferent armour protection of our cruisers, particularly as regards turret armour and deck plating, and second, the disadvantages under which our vessels laboured with regard to light; of this there is no question“
At first the destruction of the battle cruisers had been attributeded (V.A., B.C.F. to C.-in-C. June 3, in H.S.A. 229.) to open magazine doors, and a reversion to the original system of handling room supply scuttles was recommended as a matter of urgent neccesity, but in the course of investigation a strong opinion developed that the armour protection to magazines was insufficent. Admiral Leveson’s Committee decided that the exitsing decks in ships of the ORION and later classes (Upper deck 1.5“, main deck 0.5“, middle deck 1“, First Report ORION, June 6, in H.S.A. 229.) did not give sufficent protection to the crown of the magazine, and recommended an increase in this respect. It found that danger of flash exitsed and recommended the provision of airlocks in the magazine doors, metal flash screens in the trunks, and fearnought scuttles at the 6-in. hoits supplies. The Cruiser Committee on Protection offered very similar recommendations. In the case of armored cruisers they recommended reinforcing the protective deck with 1 in. of steel over the foremost and after magazines (30 tons), and generally the provision of handing room with scuttles to the magazines, of flash doors to the bottom of hoits scuttles and of fearnought screens in the passages.
Unfortunately the original design of ships placed a severe limitation on what could be done. Each class of ship had to receive separate and detailed consideration and recommendations had generally to be confined to the addition on 1-in. plating to the crown of the magazines or round the glacis of the turrets. The principal alterations recommended in the IRON DUKE included
(a) An increase in the thickness of the middle deck over the magazines from 1.5 in. to 3.5 in. (weight 39 tons).
(b) Increase in thickness of glacis plates within the citadel from 1.5 in. to 3.5 in. (estimated weight 15 tons).
(c) Fitting an airlock arrangement in 13.5 magazine doors.
(d) Fitting thin metal flash screens in 6-in. supply hoits at bottom, and fearnought scuttles at the supply from 6-in. magazine to shell room.
These recommendations involved additional weight and Weight Saving Committee took its place beside the others.
3. Opinion at Admiralty. – These considerations reacted on the ships building. The REPULSE and RENOWN, laid down early in 1915, just after Battle of the Falklands and under the influence of its special requirements, were approaching completion. It was decided to increase the protection on their main decks over the magazines to a total of 2 in., and in few months later the Commander-in-Chief recommended further deck protection amounting to an increase in weight of about 500 tons, the fitting of which was carried out at Rosyth. On this question of protection there was a ditsinct difference of opinion between the Fleet and the Chief Constructor. The fleet had seen three battle cruisers blown into the air, and attributed the disaster partly to lack of armour protection. The Commander-in-Chief regarded this as a general defect in our ships („It must always be remembered that our battleships compare very unfavourably with the German ships in regard of protection“ C.-in-C. to Admiralty, 26.04.1916) and Admiral Beatty asked for a searching enquiry into the matter.
In July (TIGER, July 14, 1916, S.01146/16) he wrote, „Since the recent Battle of Jutland it has been very strongly brought to home to me that I can recall no single instance of a German warship blowing up, as unhappily occured in the case of QUEEN MARY, INVINCIBLE, INDEFATIGABLE and DEFENCE.“
He instanced the BLÜCHER on January 24 1915, which was repeatedly hit by heavy shell; the WIESBADEN on May 31 1916, which passed the whole length of the battle line under fire; the KÖLN on August 28 1914, which had lain under the concentrated fire of five battle cruisers at about 6,000 yards range, and which had sunk without a trace of any explosion. He had seen, both on January 24 1915, and on May 31 1916, high columns of flame rising from German ships which could only have com from magazine fires, but in no case had he seen even the semblance of an explosion. On January 24 a turret in the SEYDLITZ was seen surrounded by sheets of flame as high as her masthead, thoght the QUEEN MARY and INDEFATIGABLE up to the moment of their being struck by the fatal salvos, had shown no signs of ditsress. These considerations led to the conclusion that „either our methods of ships construction are seriously at fault or that the nature of the ammunition we use is not sufficiently stable to ensure safety.“ He urged that it should be accepted tat a radical fault did exits, and suggested that a Committee of the most competent experts should be appointed to investigate the whole problem. This question raised a number of important issues.
In some departments of the Admiralty there was a ditsinct tendecy to attribute the explosion to exposure of cordite and to a system of supply involving magazine doors open, lids off cases, and cages and waiting positions loaded. They were evidently inclined to think that the weakness lay, not in the ship nor in the ammunition, but in the ordinary precautions for safety having been relaxed in order to attain a rapid rate of fire. It was in this sense at least that the Admiralty in their replay to Admiral Beatty’s letter said they were forced to the conclusion that in some of the ships engaged the precautions essentnial to the safety of cordite cartrigdes were, to a certain extent, subordinated to the great desire necessarily felt to attain a rapid rate of fire, and that the stringent instructions and measures lately instituted would sensibly diminish the risk of explosion. The Vice-Admiral , B.C.F., however, pointed out in reply that there was no evidence that in any ship lost the precautions essential to safety had been neglected. The Commander-in-Chief took the same view, and expressed the opinion that every possible means should be taken to investigate the causes of these explosions, and the method suggested by the Vice-Admiral, B.C.F. appeared to be the best. He added that during the war 14 German ships had been sunk by gunfire, of which none had blown up, while out of nine British ships – battleships to light cruisers – sunk by gunfire, six had blown up – figures which showed that the Germans had the advantage over us in either fuzes, explosives or ship construction (C.-in-C. November 24, 1916, H.S.A. 229).
Ships, however, could not be pulled to pieces and rebuilt. In the case of battle cruisers there had been a tendency, which reached its culminating point in the COURAGEOUS and GLORIUS, to reduce protection to its lowest limit so as to add to speed and gun power. This policy had bee in the ascendency when the INDEFATIGABLE was built and still found strong support. It was pointed out that „the fundamental maxim of British warship design had been that the best defence was superior power of offence.“ The adherents of this policy were so wedded to their technical convictions that they saw the most unfortunate result of the battle not so much in the disasters, as in the possibility of their inducing what tehy thought to be a false idea of the necessity and value of armour protection; they pointed out „that one would like to have as much armour as possible, but every ton of armour meant the sacrifice of some other feature in design“. They litsend regretfully to the demand for more armour and deplored the fact that the RENOWN and REPULSE „for which such sacrifies had been made, would be demobilised for many weeks and would never have the speed and draught for which they were designed“ (M.05781; H.S. 301/144)
It was in the fear that a false idea might arise and prevail as to the necessity and value of additional armour protection that a memorandum was drawn up by the Chief Constructor to support the opinion that there was no evidence to show that any enemy shell had penetrated to the magazines of British ships – rather on the contrary, the immunity of engines and boiler rooms pointed generally to an opposite conclusion. (M.05781; H.S. 301)
The view taken by him was that the fault lay in the train of cordite supply to the guns, and in a paper written in December (S.02136/1916, see Appendix A) it was pointed out that diagrams of the path of shell did not bear out the contention that German shell could penetrate the lower protective decks of modern battlecruisers and battleships before they burst.. Diagrams attached to the memorandum showed the path of twnty-nine shell in the case of six ships, and emphasised the fact that only in one case – the BARHAM – had fragments of shell penetratedthe crown of a magazine (Hit No.2, 70 – 72 stations, angle of descent 30° to 35°). There was one serious gab in these diagrams. They did not show the track of shell in the battlecruisers which had been blown up. Admiral Jellicoe did not agree with the memorandum. He did not regard it as representing the views of officers at sea, and it was not issued to the fleet. But whatever might be held on the matter it remained irrefutably true that nothing very radical could be attempted in the case of ships already built. All that could be done was to perform some patchy („The work will be patchy“ Report of Protection Committee, June 6, H.S.A. 229) reconstruction in the older ships and to add a certain amount of armour to the new.
Whether the tragic fate which befell the battlecruisers at Jutland was due to lack of protection or to faulty turret design can never be precisely known. The issue was terribly different from all expectations, and must have aroused acute disappointment both in the fleet and at Whitehall. Certain it is that in the fleet the conviction grew that the value of protection had been unduly depreciated, a view since confirmed by the surprising tenacity of the German battlecruisers and the way in which the SEYDLITZ and DERFFLINGER emerged from their fearful ordeal of fire. A strong opinion prevailed, too, that the battle had demonstrad the inferiority of our shell and fuzes. Captain Frederic Dreyer was of opinion that the German delay action fuze was superior to ours, and that the catastrophes were due to their shell bursting after penetration instead of half-way through a plate. Great efforts were set on foot to remedy these defects, efforts which, however, could not materialise till later in the war. The precise train of causation that culminated in these disasters remains wrapped in uncertainty, but certain it is that the months that followed witnessed an immense activity in every sphere of technical work, and men were thinking and working and hammering, day and night, to put things to rights.
4. Tactical Developments. – The main tactical developments arising from the Battle of Jutland can be found within the covers fo three papers:
(a) Orders of July 14 1916 for Fleet Exercises
(b) Grand Fleet Battle Orders (issue of September 11 1916)
(c) Memorandum on Defence of the Battle Fleet against Enemy Torpedo Attack, October 17 1916
The general conception of one long line of battle with fleets engaged an approximately similar courses, at a range of between 15,000 and 10,000 yards, remained the same, but measures were taken to increase the flexibility of the line and to develop a strong counter to destroyer attacks. Orders for an important exercise were issued on July 14 1916, which stated that the battle had emphasised the desirability, especially in low visibility, of developing some method of leading the line of battle in and keeping whithin effective range. It was recommended that the battle line in these conditions should be formed in echelon of squadrons or divisions with the van pressing on the enemy van, while the centre, and especially the rear, should keep at a greater range from the enemy so as to occupy a better defensive position against torpedo attack. The van divisions, which would comprise the 5th Battle Squadron and 1st Battle Squadron (as reconstituted), were well suited to these tactics owing to their excess of speed. This disposition of squadrons in echelon or on a line of bearing was to be practised during the exercises, as it gave a more flexible lind, conferred greater independence on flag officers, and was better suited than the single line for dealing with the retiring tactics adopted by the enemy on May 31. Certain signals were introduced appropriate to these tactics, chiefly with a view to reforming the single line of battle rapidly from a line of bearing or echelon. Of these the most important was the Yellow Pendant which dates from this time (Hoitsed singly directs Commanders of Divisions to form single line ahead on the Admiral or ship denoted in the sequence in which divisions now are. Hoitsed superior to alphabetical flags directs Commanders of Divisions to form single line ahead on the Admiral or ship denoted, on the course indicated and in the sequence in which divisions now are. Grand Fleet Additions to Signal Books, H.S.A. 211/3314). Another signal (B.E.) was to be treid indicating „that the Commander-in-Chief in manoeuvring only with the squadron in which the fleet flagship had taken station, and that flag officers commanding other squadrons are to support him by conforming generally to his movements“. These exercises aimed at greater flexibility and were followed two month later by a revised issue of the Battle Orders. Here, again, certain main points stand out. There is a tendency towards decentralisation, and also to empasise the descretionary power vested in Flag Officers, „owing to the difficulty, confirmed at Jutland, of controlling the movements of the whole fleet in the heat of action“. The Commander-in-Chief may make the signal M.P. to be used when „the Commander-in-Chief desires to emphasise the fact that under the exitsing conditions he finds it very difficult to control the movements of the whole battle fleet, and is a REMINDER of his desire that the Flag Officers of battle squadrons shall manoeuvre their squadrons independently whilst acting in support of the squadron or divisions to which the fleet flagship is attached. It is in no way intended to imply that such decentralisation is not to take place unless the signal M.P. is made. If made it merely points out that decentralisation has become ESSENTIAL for the time. Stress is laid in new paragraphs on the importance of the van using its speed to the utmost in order to keep within effective gun range from the enemy, provided that it does not becom isolated from the battle fleet. Finally, in Notes on the Defence of the Battle Fleet against Enemy Torpedo Attack, issued as a Memorandum, dated October 17, there is an exhaustive analysis of the measures required to counter an enemy’s torpedo attack. Briefly, they were to consits of a strong counter attack from the van by light cruisers and flotillas. This was worked out with reference to a danger line, viz., the line at which the torpedo fire of enemy destroyers becam dangerous, based on the assumption of a running range of 13,000 yards for German torpedos. It was possible for British light cruisers and destroyers to reach this line (about 5 miles from the British line of battle) in time to reach an throw back any attack on the van. The van, therefore, was adequately protected by counter attack and need not turn away. Enemy destroyers, however, attacking the centre and rear could reach this line before the British counter attack (about 4 minutes ahead of them) and the centre and rear must be prepared with a counter move, which would take the form of a turn away or a turn towards as circumstances might dictate. The alternatives were carefully discussed, and it was pointed out that in the case of a „turn towards“ the enemy it should consits of a „four point turn“ and a turn back after a transfer of 2,000 yards from the original line of advance. This policy of counter attack had been foreshadowed in a Deployment Diagram issued on June 19 to supersede one of April 7. In the Post Jutland diagrams the light cruisers and destroyer forces on the engaged bow have been strengthened and thrown with the Battle Cruiser Force further ahead and further out towards the enemy so as to develop a strong conter attack as rapidly as possible.
A number of new submarines were coming forward and instructions for the employment of submarine flottillas, with the fleet were added to the Grand Fleet Battle Orders in August, 1916. Operating from the Tees and Blyth the 10th and 11th Submarine Flotillas were to be employed in detached operations north of Lat. 55°N, and to assits in defensive measures against raids north of Flamborough Head, but might also be ordered to join the Grand Fleet, and on such occasions were to shape course so as to be about 10 to 12 miles and four points on the bows of the wing column of the fleet.
Submarine divisions in a favourable position – for instance, on the flank towards which an enemy deployed – were to attack as soon as possible. Those on the quarter of the British fleet after deployment were to come to the surface and follow the enemy battle fleet if it should turn sixteen points. These orders may be regarded as embodying the principal tactical developments arising out of Jutland.
POST JUTLAND STRATEGY
5. Conference, June 25. – The strategical effect of the Battle of Jutland was practically nil. The Germans might boast of what they had done and of their skill in retreat, but the general situation remained the same. But, though the immediate effect was small, the battle gave a renewed impetus on the British side to the arrangements for shifting the bases of the fleet which had arisen out of the Lowestoft Raid (April 24). These measures, however, could not materialise for some time, and meanwhile the scope and employment of the 5th Battle squadron gave rise to further weighty discussion. The problem can be reduced to a single sentence: Was the 5th Battle Squadron to be considered as a fast wing division of the Battle Fleet or as a support for the Battle Cruiser Fleet? This and other momentous matters – technical, strategical and tactical – were discussed at an important conference held at the Admiralty in June, at which the Commander-in-Chief and Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet were present, and where, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the following decisions were arrived at:
6. Conclusions of Conference at Admiralty, June 24.
(a) With regard to „the future employment of the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, the arrangement arrived at was that where the intiative lay with us, the battle cruisers should not be advanced so far from the support of the Battle Fleet as had been customary in the past.“
„That in the event of a raid (question of invasion in January 1916) on our eastern or south-eastern coast, when it is considered necessary that the battle cruisers shall be pushed forward without support, Their Lordship will decide the extent to which the battle cruisers are to be pushed forward in view of the circumstances which are at the time within their knowledge, and will indicate in the orders issued to me and to the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, whether it is considered necessary that the battle cruisers shall become seriously engaged with the enemy force without the support of the battle fleet.“
„This decision will be dependent upon the urgency of the situation and the strength of the enemy forces. The Fifth Battle Squadron is to be considered mainly as a fast wing division of the battle fleet and not as a portion of the Battle Cruiser Fleet.
„That occasion may arise when at my discretion I may consider it desirable to reinforce the battlecruisers with the Fifth Battle Squadron, but that they are to be considered simply as a reinforcement, and in no sense an integral portion of the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The extent to which they are utilised in support of the battle cruisers, and away from the vicinity of the battle fleet, will depend in some degree on the speed which is attained by the BARHAM on the measured mile at the mouth of the Clyde during her forthcoming steam trials (She carried out full speed trials in Bute Sound on July 6, on her way round from Devonport to Scapa. The mean speed obtained was 23.9 knots. BARHAMS log).
(b) „With regard to the ‚basing‘ of the main battle fleet, all the arrangements necessary for basing the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Battle Squadron at Rosyth instead of Scapa to be pressed forward with the utmost despatch...“
(c) „With regard to the 3rd Battle Squadron, it was decided that the 3rd Battle Squadron should, at any rate for the present, remain based on the Medway, and it is recognised that there is very little probability of the 3rd Battle Squadron ever taking part in a fleet action unless the action is fought to the southward of the Dogger Bank.“
(d) „With regard to defensive mining of the east coast approaches, the necessity for keeping the battle cruisers, under ordinary conditions, within supporting ditsance of the battle fleet adds to the difficulty already exitsing of affording protection to the south-east coast was desirable, and that the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, should suggest areas for further mining.
7. Admiralty View. The above conclusions received the general approval of the Admiralty with the observation that, with regard to (a), viz., the employment of the Battlecruisers, it was thought preferable that orders should be given that until the First, Second and Fift Battle Squadrons were based on the Forth, the Battle Cruiser Fleet, when ordered south, was not to seek engagement with the enemy MAIN forces, without definite orders from the Admiralty, until such time as the Battle Fleet was near enough to afford support. Further, the Admiralty thought it desirable to add that the 5th Battle Squadron, though in no sense an integral portion of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, „when acting under the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet, are to be fully at his disposal until the Battle Fleet joins.“
The question was evidently beset with considerable difficulties, but this was considered „ as good an arrangement as could be arrived at“, though it saddled the Admiralty with the responsibility, whenever the Battle Cruiser Fleet was ordered south, of deciding at Whitehall whether the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, was to seek a serious engagement without the support of the Battle Fleet.
The question whether the 5th Battle Squadron could act in support of the Battlecruisers depended largely on its speed, and on this point the Commander-in-Chief had come to the conclusion, that the BARHAM could not get away from the German 3rd Battle Squadron. The definite decision of the conference on the whole knotty question was recorded as follows: „The Battle Cruiser Fleet and any vessels attached to it, when ordered south, is to avoid becoming seriously engaged with superior forces until the Battle Fleet is within supporting ditsance, unless the Admiralty consider the circumstances sufficiently urgent to render a different course necessary, in which case Their Lordships will give instructions to the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet.“ (M.06427, Adty July 19 1916, H.S.A. 141/127)
A conclusion which shifted the responsibility of engaging an enemy to Whitehall (so unpleasantly suggestive of the instructions issued by the Kaiser to Ingenohl after the Battle of the Bight), was almost bound to involve the necessity of further elucidation.
8. View of Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet. – This, the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, sought in a submission of July 27, in which he pointed out that the main principles enunciated (viz., to avoid becoming seriously engaged with superior forces), had been the guiding principle governing his actions ever since the commencement of hostilities, and he was constrained to ask for guidance on certain points.
What, for instance, was a „superior force?“ Was superiority of construction to be counted in arriving an estimate, for it was an unfortunate fact that British ships blew up after only a short period of punishment, whereas the enemy did not? Again, in seeking the enemy in misty weather, experience had shown that the development of a serious engagement might be a matter of seconds only, when visibility is low and speed is high. Was the conclusion to be interpreted in the sense that all risk of contact with the enemy was to be avoided, except in rare cases of high visibility, unless powerful support was close at hand? The experience of Dogger Bank and Heligoland Bight had brought forcibly home to him the necessity for closer support, and this was the reason for his repeated applications for the 5th Battle Squadron, which, faster by 2 knots than the fastest enemy Battle Squadron, and with magnificent armament and protection, was eminently suited for the purpose. To avoid any possibility of misconception he desired to know whether he was allowed free exercise of his judgment and discretion. Was was a perpetual conflict with the unexpected. Circumstances might arise when it would be of the greatest importance for an inferior force to engage a superior force, although not closely supported. It might be imperative that risks should be run, and a hard-and-fast rule would undoubtly increase very considerably the difficulties of the Officer-in-Command and might cause the loss of opportunities of the greatest value.
9. Commander-in-Chief’s View. – The Commander-in-Chief stressed the fact that the 5th Battle Squadron, by reason of its inferior speed, would be a ditsinct source of embarrassment and risk to the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, and concluded by pointing out that the „difficulties of the Vice-Admiral were very much enhanced by the fact that he was based so much further south than his supporting force, the Battle Fleet, and his difficulty could only be overcome by the removal of the Battle Fleet to the Firth of Forth. This move, however, was not possible until port was rendered fit as a base for the Main Fleet.“
The question tended to revolve round the speed of the BARHAMS. The Commander-in-Chief held the view that a Jutland the KÖNIGS had outpaced the BARHAM, and the latter could not support the Battlecruisers without running the risk of being forced into action by a faster and superior force. This was not borne out, however, by the N.I.D. Quarterly Return for June, which gave the KÖNIG a speed of only 20.5 knots, but the point was pressed, and the figure was altered to 23 knots in the July issue, though it was maintained at the Admiralty that there was not evidence to show that their maximum speed exceeded 22 knots.
10. The origin of the Question. – The whole question hung balefully over the strategical outlook of the fleet in 1916. It had risen early in the year in a paper of Rear-Admiral Pakenham, forwarded by Vice-Admiral Beatty, which deserves close attention. The argument was briefly this: -
Owing to the ditsances which now separate British and German naval bases, no preponderance in slow vessels can enable the British to deny the Germans freedom to move at will their whole fleet in any direction within about 200 miles of Heligoland. On January 24 1915 (Doggerbank) the Germans threw out an inadequate and unsupported force, but will not again repeat the blunder. It should be presumed that in future their fast divisions will always have the fullest support at hand. It has hitherto been customary to employ the fast division (of the British Fleet) at great ditsances ahead of the main fleet. Unless control of the southern area is practically to be abandoned to the Germans, either this method must be continued, or the ditsance between the bases of the two main opposing forces must be reduced (That is to say, the British Fleet must come south). Of these two courses the former is preferred, provided that suitable precautions are feasible. Our fast division must be able to attack, but it must also be able to withdraw. The former necessity requires speed, the latter can be satisfied by vessels which, though not the fastest, are yet faster than the bulk of their opponents. How, then, can the Battle Cruiser Fleet best be reinforced? The answer is ready: A fast and powerful squadron its attached to the main fleet. Its fighting power is all that can be desired. As the prime need of the Battle Cruiser Fleet is an addition of fighting strength, at least three of the QUEEN ELIZABETHS should be at once transferred from the Main Fleet to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the others should follwo when the ROYAL SOVEREIGNS have come into service.
It may be decided that the fast fleet cannot be reinforced nor can the base of Grand Fleet be shifted. It will then be necessary to restict movements of the fast division to the neighbourhood of the Battle Fleet.
11. Commander-in-Chief, Remarks. – The Commander-in-Chief in his remarks doubted whether the BARHAMS could exceed 23.5 knots and whether under these conditions they could ever afford any material support to the Battle Cruiser Fleet in an offensive operation.
At the Admiralty, however, there was a strong opinion in favour of the idea of stationing the 5th Battle Squadron in the Forth, and it was thought that when the Grand Fleet (1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons) reached a total of 24 battleships, the Commander-in-Chief might have to reconsider the question of letting the 5th Battle Squadron work form Rosyth.
Vice-Admiral Beatty again pressed the question in a letter of March 3, urging the necessity of support for the Battlecruisers, while the Commander-in-Chief in his remarks upheld the necessity of keeping the Battle Fleet concentrated. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Arthur Wilson, was inclined to support him. He did not think that the present ditsribution of the battleships and battlecruisers could be improved. „Conclusive reasons had been given by the Commander-in-Chief against shifting the battlefleet base to the Forth. The other proposal to join the 5th Battle Squadron to the Battle Cruiser Fleet and base it at Rosyth had much to recommend it, but, on the other hand, these ships were of great value to the main fleet and might make all the difference between an ineffective chase and a decisive defeat“.
It was thought at the Admiralty that there was much to be said on either side „If we keep our fleet in its present disposition, we take no chances, but it is extremely improbable that the Germans will ever come out with the deliberate intention of going far enough north to commit suicide. They will rather, when sufficiently desperate, make a raid on the south“. The matter rested there till March 22, when the Commander-in-Chief put forward the most important proposition of the year, namely, the possibility of basing the major portion of the Grand Fleet on Rosyth as an alternative to the present disposition and with a view to the Battle Fleet being in a more favourable strategical position for dealing with the enemy.
A joint naval and military conference on the subject was held on April 5, and the Admiralty view ist to be found in an exhaustive and illuminating paper.
12. Summary of the Admiralty View. – The strength fo the two fleets was reviewed (40 British battleships and battlecruisers versus the German 23) and the First Sea Lord pointed out that „it is not, therefore, to be wondered that the Germans do not seek a fleet action and that they plan their short cruises in the North Sea so that a meeting between the fleets is impossible; and yet the German Fleet holds ours tied to our coasts and kept ready at short notice, thus involving great mental strain and greater wear and tear than they experience“.
„Scapa ist the only fleet anchorage in the North Sea capable of holding the whole fleet in moderate safety. Admirable as a war anchorage, it is not a defended port. Well situated to command the entrance to the North Sea, it lies 450 miles from the exits fo the Heligoland Bight. Consequently the German Fleet can get a day’s start for carrying out operations on the East coast, spend six hours there and return in safety without any risk of meeting the Grand Fleet. The only remedy in the case of a fleet based on Cromarty and Scapa is to keep it at sea on the first indications of German movements. But if it goes to sea a day too soon, this is useless for the fleet and the destroyers must return to refuel“.
„Consequently, unless the German Fleet seeks action with ours, or attempts to leave the North Sea by the northern exit, the chances of our fleet engaging theirs are at present almost hopeless. The Germans may also inflict great damage on the coast towns and on the French coast by bombardment; and, in fact, the protection of the southern coasts depends almost entirely on submarines at Harwich and Dover“.
„Neither Rosyth nor the Humber can base the whole fleet, and they have many local objections compared to Scapa; but in the last year the Humber has been fortified, Rosyth basin and lock are completed, and arrangements are in hand to supply anti-submarine protection to the anchorage below the Forth brigde“.
„The question to be settled is: ‚Can we risk dividing our fleet?‘ If we do not divide it we need never expect a decisive victory. If we do divide it, and a portion only meets the High Sea Fleet, it can be depended on to inflict severe losses and we shall have another fleet in reserve ready to take its place.
Considering the superiority of the armament of British ships over the German, it need not be considered that we are taking too great risk by matching a slightly greater number of vessels against the German, say – 7 battlecruisers against 5, and 21 battleships against 18.
The main battle fleet would consist of the 2nd Battle Squadron (8), the 4th Battle Squadron of the most powerful vessels (8), and 5th Battle Squadron (5). These, with one ship in the bassin and the battlecruisers (5), mustering 29 dreadnoughts, could lie in the Forth.
The remaining 9 battleships (shortly to be 11) and 3 battlecruisers would be based on Scapa or Cromarty. The 3rd Battle Squadron would be based on the Humber. What would be the result of this? If the Germans moved north, the gain would not be great; it the Germans moved south, the gain might be very great.“
One point seemed, however, certain. „The present strategical distribution of the Grand Fleet ist not likely to bring off a great and decisive naval action in the North Sea, and some change is necessary, which will probably involve risks not now taken with capital ships. This strategy would not be suggested if the present strategy would produce the desired result. There might be possibly another plan of bringing the High Sea Fleet to action – that is, by adopting an offensive instead of a purely defensive line of strategy, which might take the form of air raids, bombardments or minelaying by surface vessels. This meant that the fleet action, if it came off, would be nearer the enemy coast and fleet than had hitherto been considered as acceptable“. The minute concluded by saying „There are risks in this operation, and it might not succeed in the first attempt, but if nothing is done and we still maintain our purely defensive attitude with the Grand Fleet, there seems little chance of effecting any serious losses in the High Sea Fleet (Minute, April 5, 1916, M.02696)
13. Influence of Lowestoft Raid and Jutland. – It was decided therefore, to push on with the provision of defences in the Forth. Then came the Lowestoft Raid, the decision to send the 3rd Battle Squadron south, and a letter from the Commander-in-Chief stating the opinion that when the proposals for defending the anchorage had been carried out, it would be possible to base the 1st Battle Squadron, 2nd Battle Squadron and 5th Battle Squadron, the Battle Cruiser Fleet, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and one Cruiser Squadron, besides the necessary flotillas, in the Forth. With it came a scheme of reorganisation, which was issued and actually waiting to come into force on the very eve of Jutland.
It will be seen that the trend of opinion at the Admiralty was generally in favour of shifting the base of the fleet, with a view to increasing the chance of bringing the High Sea Fleet to action, and it is necessary to emphasise this point, for the German Staff History has spoken of the British Admiralty’s „fundamental attitude which had exalted the holding back of the fleet to a system“. Neither the Admiralty nor anyone else laid aney special stress on the policy of holding back the fleet, but before it could be thrust forward with any chance of being succesful, it had to have a base to start from. But this short word takes a long time to spell in terms of equipment and protection, and this was the strategical issue of the year. Ther was no „Post Jutland“ strategy proper, because the issue in July 1916 was the same as the issue in March. But Jutland had ist effect on the issue. It did not in itself alter the strategical disposition of the fleet, but with Lowestoft Raid before it and August 19 after it, it brought considerations to a head which had not been resolved in 1915 and resulted in the base of the fleet being changed. Till this could be done, two points of view existed as to the employment of the 5th Battle Squadron. On the one hand it was regarded as a necessary support for the battlecruisers; on the other it was thought that the four best battleships should be with the battlefleet. The one requirement may be regarded as based on strategical grounds, the other on tactical. So far as the disposition of the squadron was concerned the Admiralty adopted the former view. The 5th Battle Squadron was stationed with the Battle Cruiser Fleet in the Forth, but the tactical disposition remained in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and he imposed the condition that the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron should in future keep in visual contact with him.
Quelle: Public Record Office, Reference ADM 186/628 61485 |
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khzeun@t-online.de
Konteradmiral
Deutschland
3584 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 25.05.2004 : 16:27:43 Uhr
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Hast Dir ja 'ne Menge Arbeit gemacht. Interessant ist das sicher, aber nicht mehr ganz neu. Daß die Briten immer zwei Wahrheiten vertraten, ist allenthalben bekannt. Eine intern und eine, die für die Öffentlichkeit bestimmt war. Das kennt man aber auch anderswo her.
Beste Grüße
-khz- |
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Mario
Oberleutnant
Germany
331 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 25.05.2004 : 17:04:47 Uhr
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Um so etwas zu kennen, muß man gar nicht erst in die Geschichte zurückreisen. Da genügt schon ein Blick über den großen Teich zu Onkel Georg Dabbelju.
Der 2. Weltkrieg im Pazifik
http://mitglied.lycos.de/mgolze/ |
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ingura
Leutnant
301 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 25.05.2004 : 17:22:55 Uhr
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Ich schreib mir hier einen Wolf und ihr könnt mal gerade das Gähnen unterdrücken...
Sind wohl doch zu viele kleine Details auf die man natürlich nur achtet, wenn der Gesamthintergrund auch im Detail bekannt ist. Dann machen diese Dinge nämlich erst Freude...
Na, ja. Es war einen Versuch wert.
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Scotty
Leutnant
South Sandwich Islands
262 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 25.05.2004 : 19:33:54 Uhr
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@Mario
Dabbelju ist doch Amerikaner; da gibt es aber schon Unterschiede:
Winston Churchill hat vor langer Zeit folgendes gesagt:
Die Amerikaner machen am Ende immer das richtige, nachdem sie zuvor alle falschen Möglichkeiten ausprobiert haben. ;-)
@ingura
Interessant Dein Artikel |
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Ralf
Fregattenkapitän
Deutschland
1874 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 09:54:18 Uhr
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@ingura: Nicht doch... Ich lese ja noch... in einer Hand mein Langenscheid in der andere eine Portion Objektivität... Ich finde diese Quelle äußerst interessant. Ich danke Dir recht hezlich zu diesem Text...
Zudem fühle ich mich ein wenig in meinen Geschichtsunterricht zurück versetzt. Damals haben wir sehr viel Zeugenaussagen und SChriftstücke gesprochen und entsprechend auch versucht sie zu interpretieren...
Gruß
aus Tarp
Ralf |
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Scharnhorst
Korvettenkapitän
Deutschland
1283 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 11:43:35 Uhr
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@ingura,
vielen Dank für Deine viele Mühen.
Nur muss ich Ralf zustimmen, dass mit dem Langenscheid ist anstrengend...
Hat nicht jemand schon die deutsche Übersetzung
Gruss Michael |
Bearbeitet von: Scharnhorst am: 26.05.2004 11:44:39 Uhr |
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Ralf
Fregattenkapitän
Deutschland
1874 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 12:19:10 Uhr
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Nun mal Tapfer weiter Micha... Wir werden unser eingerostetes Schulenglisch schon aufmöbeln... ;-)
Gruß
aus Tarp
Ralf |
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ingura
Leutnant
301 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 14:19:34 Uhr
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| Wenn Ihr so große Schwierigkeiten mit dem Text habt, dann könnte ich ja mal anfangen, den Text (soweit es mir möglich ist) zu übersetzen. Den würde ich dann Absatz für Absatz neu einstellen. |
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Ralf
Fregattenkapitän
Deutschland
1874 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 14:46:23 Uhr
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Schwierigkeiten und Schwierigkeiten... Aber das wäre natürlich eine Super Sache! Was möchtest Du denn als Gegenleistung? Uns wird da sicher noch etwas einfallen, oder Micha?
Gruß
aus Tarp
Ralf |
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Killercat
Kapitänleutnant
Deutschland
567 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 14:51:48 Uhr
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immer abkürzungen für die namen kätzchen, katze, micha.
Muss so en fimmel von dir sein, hab ich Recht?
Da steh ich nun, ich armer Thor, und bin so schlau als wie zuvor |
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Ralf
Fregattenkapitän
Deutschland
1874 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 15:07:33 Uhr
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AküWa... Abkürzungswahn...
Gruß
aus Tarp
Ralf |
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ingura
Leutnant
301 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 15:30:22 Uhr
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Erster Teil (hat mich ungefähr eine halbe Stunde gekostet). Hier geschieht alles ohne Gegenleistung, ok? Der Wahrheit zuliebe.
Heimatliche Gewässer, Teil VII
Kapitel I
Nach Skagerrak
1. Technische Kommissionen – Der Großteil der Grand Fleet war bis zum 02. Juni in die Häfen zurückgekehrt, so daß Admiral Jellicoe am gleichen Tage um 21.45 Uhr die Flotte als einsatzbereit mit Vier-Stunden-Bereitschaft melden konnte Die erste, vom Ersten Seelord der Admiralität herausgegebene Äußerung, welche am 02. Juni der Presse übermittelt wurde, war von kühler Genauigkeit. Sie sprach von „schweren Verlusten“ innerhalb der Schlachtkreuzerflotte und benannte sie. . Ihre Offenheit verursachte zunächst einen ernsthaften Schock für das öffentliche Vertrauen und erweckte in einigen Kreisen ein Überraschung und Protest. Der deutsche Bericht, der in den kontinentalen Zeitungen 24 vor dem ersten offziiellen Telegram aus London erschien, erzeugte einen für den neutralen Beobachter unglücklichen Eindruck. Er erwähnte nichts vom Verlust der LÜTZOW, ROSTOCK und ELBING, oder den schrecklichen Schäden auf SEYDLITZ und DERFFLINGER und die Mitteilung der Admiralität schien die wilden Meldungen über einen deutschen Sieg zunächst zu bestätigen. Aber der Nebel der Ungewissheit lichtete sich und es wurde schnell erkennbar, das was auch immer die Deutschen sagten, die Schlacht nicht die generelle Situation auf See geändert hat. Eine ganze Serie von Anfragen wurde an die Grand Fleet unverzüglich veranlasst, um die diversen technischen Aspekte der Schlacht aufzuarbeiten und eventuell auftauchende Defizite beseitigen zu können. Eine Anzahl von Kommissionen wurde für diese Arbeit eingesetzt, von den die folgenden die wesentlichen sind:
Panzerung –
(Schlachtschiffe ) Konteradmiral A. C. Leveson
(Kreuzer) Kapitän z. S. John Dumaresq
Torpedowaffe - Konteradmiral E. F. Gaunt
Funk - Kapitän z. S. G. H. Borrett
Brandschutz und Gas - Konteradmiral Hugh Evan Thomas
Artillerie - Kapitän z. S. Frederick Dreyer
Signaldienst - Kapitän z. S. Fred L. Field
Scheinwerfer - Kapitän z. S. Fred L. Field
Ingenieurwesen - Engr. Capt. A. R. Emdin
Es ist nicht möglich, mehr als eine kurze Zusammenfassung über die Anfragen zu geben (Man kann sie finden in H.S.A. 229, 230, 231). Sie sind ausführlich und eingehend. Aber, weil viele ihrer Vorschläge schlußendlich Eingang in späteren Schiffen gefunden haben und nunmehr auch tägliches Gedankengut sind, zahlen sie sich noch immer aus, denn sie sind entstaden im Lichte der Erfahrung der Schlacht und noch immer glimmen sie in der Flotte und während man in ihnen liest, begrüßt man die große weitere Verzweigung hinein in die weitere Arbeit.
Die dunkle Wolke die von der QUEEN MARY aufstieg hing wie ein Schatten über der Flotte, und die Frage von kardinaler Bedeutung war die nach dem Schutz der vitalen Teile der Schiffe vor Steilfeuer. Zwei Kommissionen beschäftigten sich mit diesem Thema, eine für Kreuzer und Leichte Kreuzer unter der Leitung von Kapitän z. S. Dumaresq und, ergänzend eine für Schlachtschiffe unter Admiral Leveson. Sie begannen unverzüglich zu untersuchen:
A. Die Panzerung, die notwendig sei um die vitalen Teile –Magazine, Maschinenräume und Kommandotürme- gegen Granatfeuer zu schützen.
B. Die Angemessenheit der Maßnahmen in den Munitionskammer gegen Stichflammen und innere Explosionen.
C. Die Vorbeugung gegen Entzündung von Treibladungen auf dem Weg zwischen Geschützen und Magazinen.
... wird vorgesetzt
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Ralf
Fregattenkapitän
Deutschland
1874 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 15:39:33 Uhr
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Ingura: Vielen Dank...
Gruß
aus Tarp
Ralf |
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Scharnhorst
Korvettenkapitän
Deutschland
1283 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 15:43:35 Uhr
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@ingura,
das ist aber seehhrr nett von Dir.
Jetzt verstehe ich etwas mehr....
Aber hättest Du das nicht eher sagen können , dass Du den Text noch übersetzt...
Erst habe ich versucht mit dem Langenscheid weiter zukommen.
Grausam...
Und zum Schluss habe ich das Netz nach Übersetzerprogrammen abgesucht.
Nichts gefunden , -
Bin aber schon gespannt auf den weiteren Teil (Teile ).
Habe mir über Ebay nämlich letztens ein Buch ersteigert , welches den Schlachtschiffbau von 1900-1918 beschreibt.
Hauptteil natürlich die Skagerrak-Schlacht und alle vorherigen und folgenden Scharmützel.Da ist es natürlich super , jetzt alles aus einer anderen Sicht zu erfahren.
Also nochmal , hab Dank..
Gruss Michael |
Bearbeitet von: Scharnhorst am: 26.05.2004 15:46:48 Uhr |
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ufo
St.Ob.Bootsmann
United Kingdom
219 Beiträge |
Erstellt am: 26.05.2004 : 15:58:34 Uhr
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Oh - grad wollte ich einen Schwung ungeordneter Kommentare abladen?! Wie machen wir das? Warten wir bis Peter Zeit und Musse gefunden hat weite Teile zu uebersetzen, und diskutieren dann was neu, spannend, interessant oder unglaublich ist?
Ich warte erstma?!
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Thema |
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Skagerrak - mal aus englischer Sicht
Forum geschlossen
